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United States courts, both federal and state, traditionally
hear disputes in which a complainant alleges that a state or lo-
cal tax creates barriers to free trade that violate the agreement
to have a common market.: This institutional arrangement,
which derives from the United States Constitution, has paral-
lels in Europe and Australia.2 Despite such international repli-
cation of our institutional arrangements, some United States
jurists3 and scholars 4 argue that courts should grant the states
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author received his
Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard in 1983. I would like to thank my col-
leagues, Jack Cound and Dan Farber, my research assistants, Lisa Chorski and
David Olson, and, for their editorial assistance, the editors of the Minnesota
Law Review. I appreciate the opportunity presented to me by the National
Tax Association to present a draft of this paper to a panel at its November,
1990 conference in San Francisco.
1. Challenges to state taxes often receive their first hearing in a state,
and not a federal, court because the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1988), bars the federal courts from enjoining the collection of state taxes
"where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
state."
2. Dixon, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: A Tribute from Australia, 67 YALE
L.J. 179, 184-86 (1957) (author was chief justice of the High Court of Austra-
lia). See also Cappeletti & Golay, The Judicial Branch in the Federal and
Transnational Union: Its Impact on Integration, in INTEGRATION THROUGH
LAW, VOL. 1: METHODS, Too s AND INSTITUTIONS, BK. 2: POLITIcAL ORGANS,
INTEGRATION TECHNIQUES AND JUDICIAL PRocEss 261, 266-78 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW]; Heller & Pelkmans, The Federal Economy:
Law and Economic Integration and the Positive State - The U.S.A. and Eu-
rope Compared in an Economic Perspective, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW,
supra, at 245, 254-62, 405-09; Jacobs & Karst, The "Federal" Legal Order: The
U.S.A. and Europe Compared. A Juridical Perspective, in INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAw, supra, at 169,233; Rowe, Aspects of Australian Federalism and
the European Communities Compared, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAw, supra,
at 415, 453-58.
3. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343-48 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
4. See, e.g., D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 234 (1985) (the current dormant commerce
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greater freedom from commerce clause regulation. Most schol-
ars of the commerce clause believe that commerce clause chal-
lenges to state taxes present a different problem than
commerce clause challenges to other state laws, and conse-
quently require a different analysis.5 Commerce clause chal-
lenges to state taxes are, in fact, unique. Unlike most
commerce clause disputes, tax challenges neither involve com-
plicated regulatory issues nor require judicial value judgments
that arguably should be left to the legislature.
This Essay employs analytic tools of public finance eco-
nomics to analyze the goals of a free market and the relation-
ship between those goals and state taxes.6 The Essay concludes
that the most important consideration in determining the con-
stitutionality of a state tax is the relative tax cost for in-state
and out-of-state taxpayers. In deciding a commerce clause chal-
lenge to a state tax, courts should ask the following question:
Does the challenged tax have effects that place interstate com-
merce at a disadvantage? 7 To answer this question, courts
clause doctrine permits excessive judicial review); Farber, State Regulation
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 18 URBAN LAw. 567, 573 (1986) (same).
5. See, e.g., Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism" Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1182 (1986)
(observing that the Supreme Court regulates taxation issues more expansively
under dormant commerce clause analysis than it does other issues).
Many scholars carefully except challenges to state taxes from their analy-
sis. Of the three basic texts on constitutional law, G. GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 331-33 (11th ed. 1985), gives no coverage to commerce clause
challenges to taxes; J. NOWAK, D. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 260-94 (3d ed. 1986), allocates a little more than 30 pages to the entire
subject; and L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1988) covers
the subject in a 144 page chapter on federal restrictions generally. Relatively
few law review articles discuss constitutional challenges to state taxes. See
Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation: Purposeful Eco-
nomic Protectionism and Beyond, 85 MICH. L. REv. 758, 758 n.2 (1987) (stating
that the leading law reviews do not contain sustained discussions of any of the
Court's dormant commerce clause opinions that are addressed to the issue of
state taxation). One commerce clause scholar who does not except tax cases
from his analysis is Professor Hellerstein, who has published much high qual-
ity work in the area. For citations to some of this work, see infra notes 33, 67.
6. Professor Donald Regan, in the long and interesting article, Regan,
supra note 5, embraces many of the commerce clause goals advanced in this
Essay.
7. The Supreme Court on occasion does say that it regards a commerce
clause issue as a question of fact. For instance, in Interstate Busses Corp. v.
Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 251 (1928), Justice Stone said: "To gain the relief for
which it prays appellant is under the necessity of showing that in actual prac-
tice the tax of which it complains falls with disproportionate economic weight
on it.... The record does not show that it made any attempt to do so." 1d.
This Essay attempts to do something that the Court has not done; that is,
[Vol. 75:907
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should implicitly or explicitly generate factual findings such as
those that economists make concerning the effects of chal-
lenged taxes on interstate commerce.8 In particular, courts
should compare marginal costs that, according to economists,
guide economic actors.
A significant corollary of my thesis that a state tax's effects
are the most important factor in a commerce clause analysis is
the principle that doctrine should not be so influential as to
limit, rather than enhance, a court's ability to view the effects.
For example, in considering challenges to state taxes, the
United States Supreme Court has asked such doctrinal ques-
tions as whether the tax under scrutiny was direct or indirect,9
whether the tax created a multiple burden 0 or the risk of a
multiple burden,:" whether the tax rested on the "privilege" of
engaging in interstate commerce,' 2 whether the tax was fairly
related to services,' 3 and whether the tax was internally consis-
tent.' 4 None of these "tests," however, should be dispositive.
None directly xelate to relative tax costs and to the ultimate
goal of keeping markets free of unwarranted government
interference.
to give general methodological content to Justice Stone's remarks. This ap-
proach differs from that of other articles because it focuses on the variables of
economics. There are excellent articles discussing the general issue of com-
merce clause challenges to state taxes. See, e.g., Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde,
Symposium on State and Local Taxation: An Analytical Approach to State
Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REv. 879
(1986), as well as many articles by Professor Walter Hellerstein.
8. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
43 (1988), shares with this Essay a focus on the free market aspects of the com-
merce clause.
9. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 563 (1925).
10. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978), apparently re-
quired a multiple burden in fact: "Finally, it would be an exercise in formal-
ism to declare appellant's income tax assessment unconstitutional based on
speculative concerns with multiple taxation." I
11. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256-58 (1938).
12. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 606 (1951).
13. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 277-78 (1977). The
test has not been applied as written. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana, 453 U.S. 609, 614-29 (1981).
14. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984).
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I. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE
FREE MARKET: WHO WOULD COMPLAIN AND
WHY SHOULD THE COURTS PROTECT
THE FREE MARKET?
Before proceeding further, it is important to recall the nor-
mative significance and goals of the free market, as well as
threats to its existence. An understanding of these points pro-
vides guidance in selecting an appropriate legal strategy for
resolving commerce clause challenges to state taxes.
The free market attempts to increase consumer welfare by
allowing unfettered exchange to present the consumer with the
widest possible choice of goods and services. The general equi-
librium competitive market paradigm of exchange and produc-
tion postulates that, given initial endowments, free trade
results in a Pareto efficient market equilibrium. A Pareto effi-
cient market equilibrium is one in which one actor's economic
welfare cannot be improved without disadvantaging another
economic actor.15 State tax systems threaten thig market equi-
librium when the taxes impede free market goals. The follow-
ing sections describe situations when state tax systems threaten
the free market.
A. PRICE EQUALS MARGINAL COST - TAXES SHOULD NOT
CHANGE RELATIVE MARGINAL COSTS
The basic free market philosophy requires that out-of-state
taxpayers incur the same marginal tax costs as in-state taxpay-
ers.16 States should provide a level playing field, rather than an
exemption, for interstate commerce. As Adam Smith stated,
foreign goods should bear an equal tax to "leave the competi-
tion between foreign and domestic industry, after the tax, as
nearly as possible upon the same footing as before it."'17
15. Francis Bator first pulled together and presented clearly the ideas of
this paragraph in Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47
AMER. ECON. REV. 22, 22-59 (1957). Professors Due and Friedlaender present
them even more clearly and also add a proof or two. J. DUE AND A.
FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 24-37 (1973).
16. The discussion in this paragraph and in the next concerns minimiing
the welfare or dead weight loss from taxation. For an accessible discussion of
this subject, see E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE
PRICE SYSTEM 309-23, 353-54 (3d ed. 1987).
17. 2 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 29-30 (L. Reynolds & W. Feliner eds. 1963) (1st ed. 1776).
Adam Smith's ideas found expression in the Articles of Confederation that
seemed to provide for the level playing field that Smith envisioned:
Article IV. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship
[Vol. 75:907
STATE TAXES
Smith's comments contain more economic thought than might
be apparent initially to readers who are not economists. One
rationale of the free market is to allocate society's resources to
their most efficient use, thus satisfying consumers' wants at the
least cost. To ensure that taxes do not interfere with an effi-
cient economic order, taxes should disturb a pre-tax economic
order as little as possible. Pre-tax relative efficiencies and mar-
ginal costs of in-state and out-of-state taxpayers should prevail
in the post-tax environment. Only by attempting to keep rela-
tive real economic relationships intact can the tax system lower
the losses it imposes on society.
From an economist's point of view, a tax that subsidizes in-
terstate commerce by imposing higher marginal costs on in-
state producers than out-of-state producers is as undesirable as
a tax that does the opposite.' 8 The free market is desirable be-
cause free competition allows society's needs to be met at the
least cost. Justice Frankfurter's belief that the tax system
should err on the side of favoring interstate commerce - a be-
lief partially, if not completely, accepted by the Supreme Court
from 1946 to 197719 - is undesirable from an economic perspec-
tive. Economic theory does not support Frankfurter's basic
tenet that "revenue serves as well no matter what its source.
' 20
A tax that imposes higher marginal costs on in-state producers
disturbs the efficient economic order as much as a tax that im-
poses higher marginal costs on out-of-state producers.
The discussion above has focused on marginal costs, which
are the costs incurred as a result of a specific sale. Marginal
costs do not include other costs not incurred as a result of that
and intercourse among the people of the different States in this
Union. ... the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress
to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges
of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and re-
strictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such
restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of prop-
erty imported into any State, to any other State of which the owner is
an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction
shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or
either of them.
Id
18. In Schoettle, Use Taxes and the Out-of-State Seller, 48 TAx NOTES 463,
465 (July 23, 1990), I argue that small out-of-state vendors with no physical
presence in the market state should be spared collecting a use tax and that a
requirement for such collection would violate the commerce clause because of
the high administrative costs for the vendor.
19. The period runs from Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946), to
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287-89 (1977).
20. Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253.
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specific sale. For example, the marginal costs of production are
the costs of producing the last unit of output. Thus, costs in-
curred regardless of whether the last unit of output is produced
are not included as marginal costs of production.21 The stan-
dard economic model of the firm postulates that firms sell as
long as the sale price is the same as or greater than the margi-
nal costs incurred on account of the sale.22
Taxes can be considered a type of marginal cost incurred
by a seller. A firm's selling price must equal or exceed its nor-
mal marginal costs plus any taxes incurred on account of the
sale.231f a tax increases the marginal costs of out-of-state firms
without imposing a similar cost on local firms, the tax favors lo-
cal firms and thus has protectionist effects. Such a tax wastes
resources when items that were relatively more expensive pre-
tax become less expensive post-tax because competing items
bear a tax. The key to appropriate analysis is to focus on mar-
ginal costs rather than total costs or the overall tax bill. Even
if an out-of-state firm bears lower overall taxes, higher margi-
nal taxes can have protectionist effects. The following section
considers who might desire protectionist taxes.
B. THE RISK OF PROTECTIONIST TAXES
Despite the Pareto efficiency of the new equilibrium, the
move from a closed to a free-trade economy does not necessar-
fly result in an improvement in the welfare of all households.
Consumers benefit, but factory owners may not. Thus, a state
might impose taxes that discriminate against out-of-state busi-
nesses to protect local factors of production from competition
(the anticompetitive effect). Alternatively, a state might im-
pose such a tax to generate revenue (the impost motive).24
21. Id. it 252.-54.
22. See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 241-48 (6th ed. 1988) (discussing
price determination in the short-run).
23. Many taxes are excises that fall on the transaction and can fruitfully
be analyzed either as a cost incurred by the seller or as a price paid by the
buyer. Analyzing such taxes as costs imposed on sellers with a compensating
adjustment in the supply curve seems a much easier exercise than a similar
analysis involving the buyers and the demand curve. For a lucid exposition of
the principles of tax analysis, see E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 16,
at 294-323.
24. The Federalist Papers reveal more concerns about the imposts of the
states. Imposts are spoken to in The Federalist No. 7, where the focus is
mostly, if not totally, on imposts on goods imported from abroad. THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 7 (A. Hamilton). The Federalist No. 11 speaks to a free market
where "an unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will ad-
[Vol. 75:907
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State governments are frequently subject to pressure to
discourage interstate competition. Despite the argument that
may have influenced a society to choose a free trade economy,
producers may lobby governmental officials to limit freedom of
trade for items that are important to particular workers or
owners of capital.2s Such demands for protectionist taxes have
a long history. Indeed, Adam Smith noted that, in Great Brit-
ain, when the government imposed a tax on a domestic indus-
try, the clamorous complaints of the local merchants and
manufacturers that they might be undersold caused the sover-
eign to increase its tax levies on similar foreign goods.26
Protectionist taxes have solid political support, but are
likely to be passed even without such support because they gen-
erally attract little opposition. There are several reasons for
their popularity. First, as pointed out above, such taxes assist
local producers. Second, even if the local community does not
lobby for protectionist taxes, political pressures against such
taxes may be unlikely because they do not obviously fall on res-
ident businesses and constituents. Thus, a government may
pass a tax that falls primarily on out-of-state producers simply
because the in-state political system complains least about such
a tax.27
Because the political process may produce a result contrary
vance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions."
THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 89 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
25. The arguments advanced in support of such a decision have differed.
As to consumption, there is little argument: Consumers, qua consumers, are
better off. As to production, Adam Smith emphasized specialization. Free
trade permitted specialization in production and thus a greater production. A.
SMITH, supra note 17, at 12-13. David Ricardo emphasized comparative advan-
tage. Some populations have a comparative advantage in producing particular
items. The world will have a larger market basket of goods and services avail-
able for distribution if producers do that which they do best. The Federalist
Papers, especially No. 11 by Hamilton, emphasized the commercial growth
that would be made possible with free trade. THE FEDERALIST No. 11, supra
note 24, at 89.
26. A. SMITH, supra note 17, at 30.
27. Scholars who write about the non-tax aspects of the commerce clause
can be grouped according to whether they favor judicial review because of
their concerns about economic efficiency and free trade, or whether they favor
such review because of their concern with the political process that produced
the result the court is reviewing. Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New
Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources,
and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1309 (1989), does an excellent
job of reviewing and explaining these and other aspects of the commerce
clause literature. As to the instant subject, I believe that both economic and




to collective interstate goals, a judicial role in reviewing chal-
lenges to state taxes seems warranted. 28 Furthermore, because
these taxes may be enacted without explicit discriminatory in-
tent it seems appropriate not to require proof of discrimination.
Despite some recent suggestions to the contrary, the United
States Supreme Court should continue to hold that a plaintiff
alleging that a state tax violates the commerce clause need not
prove explicit discriminatory intent.29
C. TAXES MATTER
One further matter merits attention. Do taxes really mat-
ter? Some judges and other policymakers believe that state
taxes have little relation to business growth and locational deci-
sions.30 Such a belief may be based on opinion polls in which
businesses have responded that taxes were not a primary factor
influencing their business decisions. Courtroom observations -
especially in the Supreme Court - may enforce a belief that
taxes do not matter. The taxpayers who appear in court tend
to be very large firms with significant market shares, and it is
difficult to believe that taxes matter at all to them.
There are two responses to this perception. First, only
large businesses have sufficient tax liability to justify incurring
legal and other fees to contest tax liability. Thus, the litigant
before the court is always a "private attorney general" who rep-
resents smaller businesses that cannot justify the costs of tax
litigation. Second, although the effects of taxes may not be ap-
parent in the short-run, they are apparent in the long-run and
matter for everyone, including large businesses.
The key to thinking properly about tax incidence is recog-
nizing that although taxes may contribute relatively insignifi-
cantly to each individual decision, they make a significant
difference over the long-term. Businesses continually reallo-
cate their physical and human resources when they add to a
physical plant, add or subtract an employee, and generally re-
28. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18, 447
(1978).
29. The Court has traditionally held that intentional discrimination is not
required. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963).
Recently, Justice Scalia has taken the position that courts should only invali-
date facially discriminatory taxes. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,
271 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. See, e.g., Pomp, State Tax Reform for the Eighties: The New York Tax
Study Commission, 16 CONN. L. REV. 925, 943 n.48 (1984) (arguing that taxes
do not affect business locational decisions).
[Vol. 75:907
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spond to the market. Each week, businesses make thousands of
decisions involving taxes. The tax impact on any one of these
decisions may be quite small. The cumulative effect of a partic-
ular tax system entering into millions of decisions, however,
makes the world a different place than if some other tax sys-
tem had been used.31
II. A MARGINAL COST ANALYSIS OF HOW TAXES
AFFECT THE FREE MARKET
This section of the Essay provides examples of how taxes
affect the free market and suggests the criteria that courts
should employ when they analyze challenges to state taxes. I
offer the examples to support the following two major proposi-
tions of this Essay:
(1) Commerce clause challenges to state taxes should resolve ques-
tions of fact concerning relative tax costs for in-state and out-of-state
taxpayers; and
(2) The doctrinal "tests" that the Supreme Court has used to resolve
commerce clause challenges to state taxes have been more confusing
than helpful in advancing the constitutional goal of safeguarding out-
of-state taxpayers from protectionist taxes.
3 2
I illustrate the first proposition with three examples involving
an income tax, a property tax, and a compensatory tax. I illus-
trate the second proposition with several cases involving flat
taxes.
Before discussing these examples, it is important to recog-
nize that the following analysis does not involve tax incidence
analysis, but a much simpler analysis of marginal costs as they
might appear to a business taxpayer. 33 Tax incidence analysis
asks who bears the real burden of taxation and involves compu-
tations of supply and demand elasticities and similar calcula-
tions.3 Such incidence analysis can be studied at various levels
of abstraction. At one level, it is relatively accessible to those
31. See Feldstein, Tax Incidence in a Growing Economy with Variable
Factor Supply, 88 Q. J. ECON. 551, 563-70 (1974).
32. Professor Shores points out that the two leading treatise writers,
Professors Paul Hartman and Jerome Hellerstein, do not agree on the applica-
tion of the "multiple tax doctrine." Shores, State Taxation of Gross Receipts
and the Negative Commerce Clause, 54 Mo. L. REv. 555 (1989).
33. See generally Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Un-
constitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 405 (1986) (discussion
and penetrating analysis of judicial decisions in invoking tax incidence).
34. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 16, at 294.
1991]
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untrained in economics.35 At a higher level, however, it is un-
derstandable only to those who both are comfortable with
mathematical expressions and have a reasonable amount of
time for study.36 This Essay presents an analysis at the lower
level and involves no complex computations in determining
marginal tax cost.
A. INCOME TAXES - THE STATE OF SOURCE SHOULD TAx
INCOME 3 7
An income tax that taxes out-of-state taxpayers on income
not earned in the taxing state can impose marginal costs on
nonresident taxpayers that are not shared by resident taxpay-
ers. If one of a nonresident's costs of doing business in a state is
payment of a tax not only on income earned in that state but
also on income not earned in that state, that nonresident faces
a higher marginal tax cost than does a resident. The following
hypothetical, based on Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes of Vermont,38 illustrates this situation: A lawyer lives
35. See, e.g., McLure, Tax Exporting and the Commerce Clause, in FISCAL
FEDERALISM AND THE TAXATION OF NATURAL REsOURCES 169 (1983).
36. See, e.g., Schoettle, A Three-Sector Model for Real Property Tax Inci-
dence, 27 J. PuB. ECON. 355 (1985).
37. Some of the ideas presented here are related to the Uniform Division
of Income for Tax Purposes Act, which is discussed generally in State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Worldwide Corporate Income: Hearings
on S. 1688 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management Generally
of the Senate Comm on Finance, 96 Cong., 2d Sess. 816 (1980) (memorandum
of Ferdinand P. Schoettle, the author of this Essay, prepared for the General
Accounting Office).
38. 445 U.S. 425 (1980). At issue in Mobil Oil Corp. were taxes due to Ver-
mont for 1970, 1971, and 1972 - years when the price of gas was rising, the
owners of oil wells were doing quite well, and gas stations were closing. Mo-
bil's original returns had reported about $23,000,000 in operating income for
1970 and losses for 1971 and 1972. Id, at 430. In addition to Mobil's operating
income, the taxation of which was not at issue, Vermont sought to tax an ap-
portioned share of Mobil Oil's substantial dividend income. Id at 431-33. The
apportionment formula used by Vermont took the percentage of Mobil Oil's
property, payroll, and sales in Vermont and applied this percentage to deter-
mine Vermont's apportioned part not only of Mobil's operating income but
also of Mobil's more than $200,000,000 worth of dividend income. Id. at 429-30.
Apparently, the majority of Mobil's operations took place in subsidiary corpo-
rations and were not carried out by the taxpayer, Mobil Oil Corporation. Id. at
430. Because of the way in which the Vermont tax was structured, one of Mo-
bil's costs of opening a gas station in Vermont was to pay Vermont an income
tax on an apportioned part of Mobil's world-wide dividend income. The case
was decided on stipulated facts without reference to the economics of the free
market. 19 at 449. The Court held that the Vermont formula did not violate
either the federal Constitution's due process clause or its commerce clause. Id.
[Vol. 75:907
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and practices law in Alpha, a state with no income tax, and also
represents clients in Beta. The lawyer has had several long tri-
als in Beta. Beta taxes the income of the out-of-state lawyer by
employing a percentage-based formula that uses the number of
hours billed in Beta as a numerator and the total billable hours
in both Alpha and Beta as the denominator. This factor is then
multiplied by the lawyer's total income to determine the per-
centage of taxable income in Beta. May Beta use the same
formula to tax some of the lawyer's income from dividends,
capital gains, or book royalties? Answer: No, because such a
tax would have both impost and anticompetitive effects. If
Beta taxed peripheral income, an out-of-state lawyer consider-
ing whether to accept a trial in Beta would need to consider not
only taxes on the income earned at the trial but also taxes on
the lawyer's dividends, capital gains, and royalties. In-state
lawyers, however, would only consider taxes imposed on the in-
come earned at the trial because they would already be paying
taxes on their other income.
If Beta did tax peripheral income, the economic impact
would clearly be protectionist. If a nonresident's cost of doing
business in a state is payment of a tax not only on income
earned in that state, but also on income not earned in that
state, the tax is protectionist. Such a system also has impost ef-
fects in that it raises revenue from out-of-state taxpayers.39
Despite these adverse effects, however, applying a rule that
only the source jurisdiction may tax the income may prove im-
possible because of the difficulty in some cases of determining
where income is earned.
B. PROPERTY TAXES - DOUBLE TAXATION Is NOT
NECESSARILY PROTECTIONIST AND CAN PROMOTE
FREE MARKET GOALS
The Supreme Court has traditionally expressed concern
that state taxes may impose double taxation on out-of-state
businesses. Facially, this appears to be a valid concern. Yet,
from the viewpoint of advancing free market goals, the Court
should instead focus on the impost and anticompetitive effects
of a challenged tax. For example, the following hypothetical,
based on Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,40 shows
39. The Supreme Court has from time-to-time embraced the territorial
principle. See, e.g., Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920).
40. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). The California property tax against which the
Court provided protection appeared to have no protectionist effects. Id. at 445.
1991]
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that double taxation does not always result in protectionist ef-
fects: A company, Widgets, owns personal property and leases
it to users. Widgets' home state levies a property tax on per-
sonal property, wherever situated, of all resident taxpayers.
The basis for such taxation is ownership by a resident. Widgets
also leases property to users in another state, "the state of mar-
ket." The state of market levies a personal property tax on all
business personal property used in the market state regardless
of where the owner resides. Does the double taxation of the
leased property - once by the home state and once by the state
of market - have impost or anticompetitive effects? Answer:
No, such double taxation has neither impost nor anticompeti-
tive effects. The marginal cost for all taxpayers bidding to lease
property tousers in the market state includes the property tax
of the market state. If Widgets were not required to pay the
property tax of the market state, its marginal costs of doing
business in the market state would include no tax costs. Fur-
thermore, because Widgets must pay the property tax to the
home state regardless of where it leases the property, that tax
is not a marginal cost of doing business in the market state.
The rationales supporting the free market suggest that the
state of market should impose its property tax on leased prop-
erty owned by out-of-state lessors. Double taxation in this situ-
ation is efficient. Exempting the property of the out-of-state
lessor from property taxation results in lower marginal tax
costs for the out-of-state lessor than the in-state lessor, and
thereby violates the free market goal of allowing real costs, not
tax costs, to determine relative prices.
C. COMPLEMENTARY TAXES - Focus ON MARGINAL COSTS,
NOT THE TOTAL TAX BILL
Complementary taxes provide a good example of the need
to focus on marginal costs rather than the total tax bill.41 Sup-
pose that a state has very high property and sales taxes. The
sales taxes apply to sales of machinery and equipment. Sup-
pose further that the state is concerned about its local produ-
cers of machinery and equipment, who must pay both the high
The Court struck down the tax because of the international ramifications of its
application. i at 451-53.
41. Recent examples of complementary tax cases are Armco, Inc. v. Har-
desty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984), and Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State
Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987). For an illuminating, detailed discussion
of the cases both current and historical that consider complementary taxes,
see Hellerstein, supra note 33.
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sales and property taxes. The state therefore enacts a comple-
mentary tax scheme: It charges local firms sales tax on in-state
sales of machinery and equipment, but simultaneously gives lo-
cal firms a rebate on property taxes for the amount of sales tax
incurred. The state gives no rebate to out-of-state producers
who have not paid a local property tax. Is this complementary
tax scheme protectionist? Answer: Yes, it is protectionist. An
out-of-state firm selling its products must recover both costs of
production and of sales tax. In contrast, a local firm, which re-
ceives credit against its property taxes for its sales taxes, effec-
tively pays no sales tax and therefore incurs no marginal tax
costs on an in-state sale. The key to analyzing a complemen-
tary tax system, therefore, is to focus on marginal costs. Be-
cause of the credit arrangement, the local firm incurs no
marginal tax cost on new in-state sales, regardless of the over-
all tax liability of the two firms.
D. FLAT TAXES - DOCTRINAL TESTS ARE CONFUSING
Flat taxes, which are in the form of fixed fees, include li-
cense taxes and annual activity taxes. Such taxes can advance
both impost and protectionist goals by raising revenues from
out-of-state taxpayers and by resulting in some anticompetitive
effects. For example, a resident producer might allocate a li-
cense tax to domestic production throughout the year and
thereby incur a relatively low per unit cost. On the other hand,
such a tax may result in a greater per unit cost for out-of-state
producers because they do less business in the state. Thus, such
a tax may convince the least profitable producers to forego do-
ing any business in the state.4
It is important to recognize that once an out-of-state pro-
ducer pays the fixed fee, the marginal tax costs are the same
for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers. The higher marginal
cost for the out-of-state taxpayer arises when the out-of-state
taxpayer decides whether to do business in the taxing state.
After the out-of-state taxpayer decides to do such business in
the state and pays the fixed fee, the out-of-state taxpayer and
the in-state taxpayer incur equal per unit marginal tax costs.
The United States Supreme Court has decided many cases
involving fixed fees. The three cases I discuss - Case of the
42. From the point of view of maximizing the yield from the tax, the state
must select a tax rate that causes some potential taxpayers to withdraw from
the state. Not until the base starts to decrease does the state have an incentive
to lower its tax rate.
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State Freight Tax,43 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District,"
and American Trucking Associations v. Scheiner4 5 - were de-
cided in 1873, 1887, and 1987, respectively. The cases are similar
in that in each case the majority invalidated a state tax because
the tax had forbidden protectionist effects. Furthermore, in all
three cases, rather than basing its opinion on the straightfor-
ward ground that the effects of the tax rendered it a forbidden
"regulation of commerce," the Court either gave no explicit
ground of decision or announced a subsidiary test or rule of de-
cision. Most often, the announced rule, such as "no regulations
can be made directly affecting interstate commerce, ' 46 was
merely a verbalism with no commonly understood application.
In each case, however, the dissenters focused on the majority's
announced rule, not the tax facts, and interpreted the majority
opinion to hold that a particular type of tax was valid or inva-
lid, not that the challenged tax had forbidden effects. Although
the Court correctly decided the three cases, the Court's failure
to explicitly rely on a tax's forbidden effects on interstate com-
merce deserves criticism.
1. Case of the State Freight Tax (1873)
The United States Supreme Court in 1873 first invalidated
a state tax for violating the commerce clause in Case of the
State Freight Tax.4 7 The challenged tax, which Pennsylvania
levied on all freight carried in the state, varied from two cents
per ton for mined products to five cents per ton for most other
freight.48 The Reading Railroad Company presented evidence
of the percentage of total tax revenues collected from freight
passing through Pennsylvania, which showed disproportionate
effects on interstate commerce. According to the uncontro-
verted facts, $46,520 of $84,881 in taxes paid by the Reading
Railroad to the state for three quarters of a year was for freight
exported to locations outside Pennsylvania.4 9 Pennsylvania ar-
gued that the tax was facially neutral and a fair charge for the
43. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873).
44. 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
45. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
46. Robbins, 120 U.S. at 494.
47. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873).
48. Id at 273. See also id at 233 (the statute and its particulars are set
forth in the reporter's unofficial statement of the case).
49. Id at 234 (reporter's unofficial statement of the case).
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use of Pennsylvania's public works.5°
The challenged tax was more of an impost than a protec-
tionist tax. Pennsylvania occupies a key position because most
freight shipped from the mid-Atlantic or New England states
must pass through Pennsylvania on its way west. The chal-
lenged tax in effect charged a toll for such passage, and the toll
had no relationship to the use of Pennsylvania's public facili-
ties. Emphasizing the disadvantageous effects of this flat tax on
interstate commerce, the Court compared the tax to a customs
duty51 and invalidated it. Two dissenting justices focused on
the facial neutrality of the tax.
52
In a similar case decided the same day as Freight Tax, the
Reading Railroad challenged another Pennsylvania tax. In
State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts,5" the Court reviewed
Pennsylvania's unapportioned tax of three-quarters of one per-
cent on the Reading Railroad's gross receipts. The Court's
opinion, written by Justice Strong, who also wrote the Freight
Tax opinion, upheld the tax.M Justice Strong easily could have
distinguished the Gross Receipts gross receipts tax from the flat
tax in Freight Tax by explaining that the former did not have"
as great a deterrent effect on interstate commerce as the latter.
In contrast to the flat tax, the gross receipts tax did not single
out interstate commerce and treat it disproportionately. In-
stead, Justice Strong's Gross Receipts opinion referred, inter
alia, to taxes on transportation and to taxes on its fruits.55 His
50. Id at 258-67 (reporter's unofficial summary of Pennsylvania's argu-
ments that favored upholding the tax).
51. Id- at 276-77. The Court said:
The same power that may impose a tax of two cents per ton upon coal
carried out of the State, may impose one of five dollars. Such an im-
position, whether large or small, is a restraint of the privilege or right
to have the subjects of commerce pass freely from one State to an-
other without being obstructed by the intervention of State lines. It
would hardly be maintained, we think, that had the State established
custom-houses on her borders, wherever a railroad or canal comes to
the State line, and demanded at these houses a duty for allowing mer-
chandise to enter or to leave the State upon one of those railroads or
canals, such an imposition would not have been a regulation of com-
merce with her sister States. Yet it is difficult to see any substantial
difference between the supposed case and the one we have in hand.
Id. at 276.
52. Id. at 282 (Swayne & Davis, JJ., dissenting).
53. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1873).
54. Id. at 296.
55. Id. at 295. Justice Strong, writing for the Court, stated that:
While it must be conceded that a tax upon interstate transportation is
invalid, there seems to be no stronger reason for denying the power of
a State to tax the fruits of such transportation after they have become
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opinion is confusing and has received well-deserved criticism.5
Three dissenting justices in the Gross Receipts case added
to the confusion already created by the majority opinion. They
described Freight Tax as setting forth the rule that taxes on
transportation are unconstitutional.57
2. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District (1887)
Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, the most well-
known of the three cases I discuss, held that the Shelby County
Taxing District, which included Memphis, Tennessee, could not
constitutionally require all those offering goods for sale in the
taxing district and not having a regular licensed house of busi-
ness, to pay a ten dollar per week or a twenty-five dollar per
month tax before offering goods for sale.58 The majority opin-
ion, written by Justice Bradley, emphasized the tax's deterrent
effect on out-of-state sellers. Justice Bradley stated that "[t]o
say that such a tax is not a burden upon interstate commerce, is
to speak at least unadvisedly and without due attention to the
truth of things."5 9
The Court, rather than relying on a finding of fact that the
challenged taxes were a sufficient impediment to out-of-state
vendors to constitute an unjustifiable regulation of commerce,
cited Freight Tax for the rule that "[i]nterstate commerce can-
not be taxed at all."6 As a marginal cost analysis demon-
strates, the tax challenged in Robbins had a highly protectionist
effect. The marginal costs of attempting to make a sale in the
intermingled with the general property of the carriers, than there is
for denying her power to tax goods which have been imported, after
their original packages have been broken, and after they have been
mixed with the mass of personal property in the country.
Id.
56. It is easy to criticize the doctrine laid out in these cases. Professor
Currie, in his excellent history of this period, refers to the distinctions made
by the Court as "sterile." See D. CURRIE, supra note 4, at 339; see also Kitch,
Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM
AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 28 (A. Tarlock, ed. 1981) (regarding the Court's
reasoning as "bizarre"). Scholars who concentrate on the holdings of the cases
and overlook the verbiage are more approving. See, e.g., Powell, Indirect En-
croachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States, 32 HARV.
L. REV. 902, 917-18 (1919).
57. Gross Receipts, 82 U.S. at 298 (Miller, Field & Hunt, JJ., dissenting).
The dissenters characterized the holding in Freight Tax as follows: "And it is
there declared that any tax upon the freight so transported, or upon the car-
rier on account of such transportation, is within the prohibition." 1id.
58. 120 U.S. 489, 499 (1887).
59. Id. at 495.
60. Id. at 497.
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jurisdiction were zero for those already there, but substantial
for those who had no permanent place of business and had not
paid the tax. In his dissent, Chief Justice Waite emphasized, as
had the dissenters in Freight Tax, the facial neutrality of the
statute. He argued that the tax was not discriminatory because
the fee was required from all taxpayers without a permanent
place of business.6 '
3. American Trucking Associations v. Scheiner (1987)
American Trucking Associations v. Scheiner,62 a 1987 case,
resolved a commerce clause challenge to an annual axle tax im-
posed on all trucks using Pennsylvania's highways. Although
the industry was different - trucking instead of railroads -
the facts of the 1987 case were similar to the facts of the 1873
Case of the State Freight Tax. Pennsylvania imposed an annual
marker fee or axle tax of thirty-six dollars per axle on trucks
weighing more than 26,000 pounds operating on Pennsylvania's
highways and delivered a rebate to trucks traveling less than
2,000 miles.6 3 Evidence indicated that tax revenues for the fis-
cal years 1982-83 and 1983-84 were about $136,000,000, with
$107,000,000 derived from trucks registered in states other than
Pennsylvania.64 The cost per mile for out-of-state trucks was
approximately five times more than the cost per mile incurred
by local trucks.6
The challenged Pennsylvania tax scheme had both impost
and anticompetitive effects. The impost effects were substan-
tial. As was the case with railroad freight more than 100 years
earlier, most freight shipped by truck from the mid-Atlantic or
New England states had to pass through Pennsylvania on its
way west. The Pennsylvania tax also had visible protectionist
effects. An out-of-state trucker who considered using Penn-
sylvania's highways faced higher costs for the first few uses of
those highways - $180 for a five-axle truck.66
61. Id at 500.
62. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
63. MdL at 274.
64. 1&k at 276 n.10.
65. Id at 286.
66. Among other reasons was that advanced by Professor Lockhart.
Lockhart, who was concerned about the cumulative effect of flat taxes on in-
terstate journeys, noted: "True, each fee is imposed upon the use of different
states' highways, but the cumulative effect does not result from the mileage or
distance traveled, but from the interstate character of the journey. The same
mileage in one state would result in only one tax." Lockhart, State Tax Barri-
ers to Interstate Trade, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1253, 1269 (1940). This statement is
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A divided Court held the challenged tax unconstitutional.
As in the earlier 1873 and 1887 cases, neither the majority opin-
ion by Justice Stevens nor the dissenting opinions by Justices
O'Connor and Scalia analyzed the challenged tax in terms of its
effect on interstate commerce. Instead, the majority applied
the "internal consistency" test, which asks whether a tax would
impermissibly interfere with free trade if every state applied
the tax.6 7 The challenged tax failed the test. Justice O'Connor
contended that precedent supported the flat tax.68 As did the
dissenters in Freight Tax69 and Robbins,70 Justice Scalia argued
that the tax should be upheld because it was facially neutral.71
He also argued that there was no constitutional support for the
internal consistency test.
While the truckers only persuaded a slight majority of the
Court of the tax's invalidity, they argued their cause with more
success before the state legislatures. Seven states passed special
"retaliatory taxes" that were collected only from trucks regis-
tered in the nine states, including Pennsylvania, that imposed
flat taxes,72 such as the challenged tax in American Trucking
true. But also true is the fact that once the tax is paid, there are no added
marginal costs. The increased marginal cost and anticompetitive effect only
occurs with respect to the early use when the truck owner decides whether or
not to use a state's highways, register, and pay the tax.
67. See generally Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflec-
tions on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 138 (1988) (analyzing the genesis and utility of the "internal consis-
tency" test). Professor Hellerstein concludes that adoption of this doctrine
was unnecessary because the case in which it was invoked could have been de-
cided by "a straightforward application of the venerable fair apportionment re-
quirement." Id. at 187. Instead, the Supreme Court "has embraced a doctrine
of 'internal consistency' that may introduce confusion and uncertainty in an
area of the law that has had more than its fair share of both." Id.
68. In American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 298 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), Justice O'Connor cited as directly on point Capitol
Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950); Aero Mayflower Transit Corp.
v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495 (1947); and Aero Mayflower Transit
Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935). She also noted the
scholarly criticism of Professors Brown and Lockhart. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 483 U.S. at 299 (citing Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter
and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 232 (1957)). See also Lock-
hart, supra note 66, at 1267-70.
69. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 282 (1873) (Swayne & Davis, JJ., dissenting).
70. 120 U.S. 489, 500 (1887) (Waite, Field & Gray, JJ., dissenting).
71. Justice Scalia advanced this ground in a dissent joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist. American Trucking Ass'ns, 483 U.S. at 304 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
72. An example of such a retaliatory tax can be found in Dennis v. Hig-





The following section considers why truckers and state leg-
islatures seem to understand the situation better than the
Supreme Court. American Trucking should not have been a
difficult case; the Court should have invalidated Pennsylvania's
tax for the reasons advanced by Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist No. 7 in which Hamilton warned of "the opportuni-
ties which some states would have of rendering others tributary
to them by commercial regulations."73 He pointed to New York
as his example of a state which could impose duties that would
ultimately be borne "by the inhabitants of the two other
states74 in the capacity of consumers of what we import.175
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL - THE ROLE OF
COMPARATIVE TAX COSTS IN SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS
The case method of legal instruction contends that stu-
dents will better understand the judicial decisionmaking pro-
cess if the students' attention is directed to cases and their
facts, rather than to restatements or black letter expositions of
the law. Such a case method study of commerce clause chal-
lenges to state taxes would reveal that the free market ideas es-
poused by Adam Smith, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
and other intellectuals have guided the Court's consideration of
constitutional challenges to state taxes. Although the Court
discusses formal tests and rules, free market ideas provide a
better basis for understanding and predicting those decisions.
This section provides support for the proposition that economic
ideas have always been the basis for the holdings of these cases.
It then questions whether the Court should explicitly, rather
than implicitly, relkr on free market ideas in its decisionmaking.
A. THE COURT'S TRADrIONAL CONSIDERATION OF ECONOMIC
EFFECTS
In commerce clause cases, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly written inexact opinions, with inexplicit grounds of deci-
sion, while actually relying on economic arguments. This
characterization has practical significance because a lawyer who
uses economic arguments and relative tax cost analysis in com-
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 63 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
74. The two other states that Hamilton used in his example were Con-




merce clause challenges to state taxes has a better chance of
winning cases. Even if a court applies a doctrinal test in its
opinion, it will nevertheless announce a holding that advances
the societal interest in the free market. Therefore, a lawyer
should always introduce evidence comparing tax costs for in-
state and out-of-state taxpayers and emphasize that comparison
in the litigation strategy. As the following comments demon-
strate, a lawyer who does not make this comparison risks losing
a good case.
In 1919, Thomas Reed Powell, who published an eight-part
article on the commerce clause in the Harvard Law Review,76
recognized that the Supreme Court implicitly relies on eco-
nomic effects:
If we discard all the doctrinal disquisitions of the opinions and look
only to the results of the decisions, we find that the controlling mo-
tive of the Supreme Court has been the desire to prevent the states
from imposing on interstate commerce any peculiar or unusual bur-
den. Where the court has been assured that the state did not have a
device which might be operated to discriminate against interstate
commerce, taxation of that commerce has been allowed.... When it
imposes license or franchise or occupation taxes, or adopts any other
revenue devices which are not certain to fall equally on all enterprise
within the state, then it runs the risk of disappointment whenever it
seeks to lay its hand on interstate commerce. What the court is insis-
tent upon is that there must be adequate safeguards against subjecting
interstate commerce to heavier taxation than local commerce. It does
not require the states to confer a bounty upon interstate commerce by
exempting it from burdens which competing business must bear.
77
Supreme Court Justice Stone also recognized the impor-
tance of a challenged tax's effect on interstate commerce. Dis-
senting in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,78 decided in 1927, he
criticized the majority for basing its decision on whether the
state tax was a prohibited "direct" tax on interstate commerce
or a permitted "indirect" tax:
In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action by in-
quiring whether the interference with commerce is direct or indirect
seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too
remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus making use of the ex-
pressions, 'direct' and 'indirect interference' with commerce, we are
doing little more than using labels to describe a result rather than any
76. Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Powers of the States, 31 HARV. L. REv. 321, 572, 721, 932 (1918); Powell, supra
note 56, at 234, 374, 634, 902.
77. Powell, supra note 56, at 917-18.
78. 273 U.S. 34, 43-45 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting), overruled, California v.
Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 115-16 (1941).
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trustworthy formula by which it is reached.7 9
Stone's insight was not new to him and had been recog-
nized by others. For example, the editors of the 1927 Texas
Law Review stated that "[p]robably the result reached by a ma-
jority of the Court in applying the test... depends not so much
on the application of the tests as such as on their opinion of the
ultimate effect of the decision on the free flow of interstate or
foreign commerce."80 Surprisingly, when Justice Stone later
wrote a majority opinion in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue,"' he did not adopt a factual approach but instead an-
nounced a new test. He emphasized protecting against multiple
burdens and ensuring that the challenged tax was not suscepti-
ble of replication in other states, thereby imposing a cumulative
burden on interstate commerce.8 2
The risk-of-multiple-burdens test was not a significant im-
provement on previous tests. It did not completely reflect the
judicial decisionmaking process, and the Court continued to im-
plicitly rely on economic factors. For example, two years after
Western Livestock, the McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
Mining Company8 3 Court upheld New York's two percent sales
tax on coal shipped from Pennsylvania. Because both states
could tax the transaction - although Pennsylvania did not do
so - the risk-of-multiple-burdens test dictated invalidating
New York's tax. Nevertheless, Justice Stone, writing for the
Court, upheld the tax and reached the correct result. Free
market doctrine dictated upholding New York's tax so that the
New York buyer's choice would depend on the relative cost of
the coal, not on saving taxes. As far as doctrine and tests are
concerned, Chief Justice Hughes's dissent in McGoldrick more
faithfully applied Stone's risk-of-multiple-burdens approach
than Stone's opinion for the Court.8
Several years later, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
Court in Freeman v. Hewit,s5 expressly recognized the impor-
tance of specific facts and effects in previous decisions:
To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past would
79. 273 U.S. at 44.
80. Recent Cases: Constitutional Law - Foreign Commerce - License
Tax Placed on Persons Selling Steamship Tickets From or to Foreign Coun-
tries, 5 TEX. L. REv. 318, 319 (1927).
81. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
82. I& at 260.
83. 309 U.S. 33, 51 (1940).
84. Id at 69 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
85. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
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neither clarify what has gone before nor guide the future. Suffice it
to say that especially in this field opinions must be read in the setting
of the particular cases and as the product of preoccupation with their
special facts.
86
Justice Rutledge, concurring in the same case, made a similar
observation:
Judgments of this character and magnitude cannot be made by la-
bels or formulae. They require much more than pointing to a word.
It is for this reason that increasingly with the years emphasis has
been placed upon practical consequences and effects, either actual or
threatened, of questioned legislation to block or impede interstate
commerce or place it at practical disadvantage with the local trade.
87
All of the above quotations were made by "experts" - jurists
or scholars who were knowledgeable of and interested in com-
merce clause issues. They recognized that the Court's motiva-
tion for a decision did not always expressly appear in an
opinion. The following section considers whether the Court
should abandon such "judicial dishonesty" and explicitly state
the basis for its decisionmaking.
B. A PROPOSAL FOR FUTuRE DECISIONMAKING
The Supreme Court should adopt a more direct approach
to deciding commerce clause challenges to state taxes by study-
ing free market goals and analyzing whether a challenged tax
interferes with those goals.8 8 Several considerations support
this approach. First, it is simpler and more straightforward
than the traditional indirect approach. The established legal
doctrine concerning constitutional challenges to state taxes can-
not be well-managed in briefs and opinions. Too many doc-
trines, old cases, and opinions that obscure, rather than
illuminate, the real grounds of decision occupy the shelves of
legal libraries. Neither the Supreme Court law clerks nor the
young lawyers writing briefs are well-trained in the nuances of
commerce clause adjudication. They know more about public
finance economics than the approaches used by various de-
ceased justices to analyze commerce clause challenges to state
taxes. Justice O'Connor's dissent in American Trucking As-
sociations v. Scheiner illustrates the general misunderstanding
86. Id. at 252.
87. I& at 270 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
88. Professor Robert Nagel criticizes the Court for adopting a "cumber-




of Supreme Court precedents.8 9
The majority in American Trucking invalidated Penn-
sylvania's flat taxes. Justice O'Connor dissented on the ground
that the Supreme Court had previously held that flat taxes
were valid. She cited two cases involving flat taxes on motor
carriers to support the proposition that flat taxes that are rea-
sonably related to the benefit conferred are valid regardless of
their effect on interstate commerce. The first case, Aero
Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission
(Aero Mayflower i),90 upheld a flat tax of twenty-five dollars
per year. The Aero Mayflower I Court, however, clearly upheld
the challenged tax only because it was so small and therefore
did not interfere with interstate commerce.91
Justice Cardozo, who wrote the Aero Mayflower I opinion,
relied as follows on three earlier opinions written by Justice
Brandeis. In Clark v. Poor,92 Justice Brandeis upheld Ohio's
annual tax on common carriers, specifically stating that the tax
was not "so large as to obstruct interstate commerce."9 3 On the
other hand, one year later in Sprout v. City of South Bend,94
Justice Brandeis stated that although states can collect reason-
able license fees, South Bend's license fee was unconstitutional
because it had a serious disproportionate effect on interstate
commerce. Brandeis reasoned that "[a] flat tax, substantial in
amount and the same for busses plying the streets continuously
in local service and for busses making, as do many interstate
busses, only a single trip daily, could hardly have been designed
as a measure of the cost.., of the use of the highways." 95 Fi-
nally, Brandeis wrote another opinion, Interstate Transit, Inc.
v. Lindsey,96 invalidating a $500 per year flat tax on busses. In
Aero Mayflower I, after analyzing Brandeis' opinions, Justice
Cardozo reasoned that a minimal tax, such as the flat tax of
twenty-five dollars per year, was valid.97 Thus, contrary to Jus-
tice O'Connor's claim, Aero Mayflower I does not support the
proposition that flat taxes are per se valid.
89. See 483 U.S. 266, 298 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
90. 295 U.S. 285 (1935).
91. I& at 289.
92. 274 U.S. 554 (1927).
93. Id at 557.
94. 277 U.S. 163 (1928).
95. Id at 170.
96. 283 U.S. 183, 188 (1931).




The second case cited by Justice O'Connor, Aero
Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners of
Montana (Aero Mayflower 11),98 upheld a flat tax of fifteen dol-
lars per year. This 1947 case, involving the same taxpayer as
Aero Mayflower I, also does not support Justice O'Connor's
proposition. On the basis of Aero Mayflower I and Clark v.
Poor, the Aero Mayflower II Court held the fifteen dollar per
year tax a fortiori constitutional,9 but both Aero Mayflower I
and Clark v. Poor, as I have just shown, had narrow holdings.
Justice O'Connor also cited a third case, Capital Grey-
hound Lines v. Brice,'°° to support her claim. In Capital Grey-
hound Lines, the Court upheld a tax scheme adopted by
Maryland whereby the state, prior to issuing a certificate of ti-
tle for a new vehicle, required payment of a tax of two percent
of the vehicle's value. 10 ' Because the opinion emphasizes the
effect of the state tax on commerce, Capital Greyhound Lines
also does not support the proposition that flat taxes are per se
valid.102
Because the Supreme Court opinions traditionally have
been inexplicit and indirect, and because the announced
grounds of decision are not always the true grounds, the old
cases can be misleading. There is in fact no line of cases hold-
ing, as Justice O'Connor suggests, that flat taxes are per se
valid. Yet this conclusion only becomes apparent after reading
the citations in Aero Mayflower L Notwithstanding poor re-
search, however, the error arises from making the analysis in
terms of prohibited or permitted taxes rather than in terms of
prohibited or permitted effects. Thus, repetition of Justice
O'Connor's misunderstanding seems likely 03
98. 332 U.S. 495 (1947).
99. Id. at 503.
100. 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
101. 1I at 548.
102. For instance, the Capital Greyhound Lines Court, although not offer-
ing much hope of success, did state:
Carriers may challenge the taxes as applied, and upon proper proof
obtain a judicial declaration of their invalidity as applied. ... Little
need be said as to the faint contention here that the taxes actually
levied against appellants are in excess of a fair compensation for the
privilege of using Maryland roads.... [The assignments of error
here did not specifically mention such a challenge.
IHL at 547-48.
103. Most immediately, the error is replicated with respect to the same is-
sue. Writing for four members of the Court in a 1990 case, American Truck-
ing Ass'ns v. Smith, which considered whether flat taxes should be refunded,
Justice O'Connor wrote "Scheiner established a new principle of law by over-
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A different method of analyzing constitutional challenges
to state taxes might not be necessary if the Court's current
analyses were consistent. The Court's current analyses, how-
ever, are not consistent. For example, in Complete Auto
Transi Inc. v. Brady,104 the Court overruled Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor' 0 5 and thereby abandoned Justice
Frankfurter's taxes-on-interstate-commerce approach. In Com-
plete Auto, the Court analyzed Mississippi's gross income tax,
which was levied on an auto transit company that only did busi-
ness in Mississippi. The Court could have upheld the chal-
lenged tax because it had no protectionist effects and no
societal goal would be met by invalidating it. Instead, the Court
referred to several unmade claims:
We note again that no claim is made that the activity is not suffi-
ciently connected to the State to justify a tax, or that the tax is not
fairly related to benefits provided the taxpayer, or that the tax dis-
criminates against interstate commerce, or that the tax is not fairly
apportioned.' 06
This reasoning, however, is ambiguous and provides no clear
standards. The first two tests - nexus and relationship to ben-
efits - may not relate to free market goals. Nexus only has
limited direct relevance to the commerce clause. For example,
even if a taxpayer has no physical presence in the taxing state,
a tax on income earned in that state may not burden interstate
commerce. The requirement that taxes fairly relate to benefits
does appear in some flat-tax cases, such as Justice Brandeis'
opinion in Sprout v. City of South Bend.10 7 As a general propo-
sition, however, taxes should not relate to benefits, but should,
as most do, take from those that have in order that the state
may give to those who have not. 0 8 Whether a tax "discrimi-
nates" or is "fairly apportioned" depends on the chosen analysis
- an analysis that I believe should emphasize marginal tax
cost.
ruling those aspects of the Aero Mayflower cases on which the State of Arkan-
sas relied in enacting and assessing" its flat tax. American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2332 (1990).
104. 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977).
105. 340 U.S. 602, 608 (1951).
106. 430 U.S. at 287.
107. 277 U.S. 163, 170 (1928).
108. Because so much of the benefit of state and local expenditures flows
to poorer households, the state and local tax and expenditure system is in fact




Historically, tests and doctrines have clouded the Court's
vision in its analysis of commerce clause challenges to state
taxes. Recently, the clouds have been getting darker. The law-
yers who should provide some of the light in their briefs are
not as well trained as their predecessors. Furthermore, the aca-
demic community offers little help. Few academics consistently
teach, research, and write in the area of commerce clause chal-
lenges to state taxes. Among those who do write in this area,
many only study the subject for a short time and have little
training in taxation, case law and the economics of the free
market.
Thus, guidance in the area of commerce clause challenges
to state taxes is needed. I propose the following test: When de-
ciding such a case, a court should ask one question - "Does the
challenged tax have effects that place interstate commerce at a
disadvantage?" In answering this question, the court should im-
plicitly or explicitly generate factual findings concerning the ef-
fects of challenged taxes on interstate commerce, such as
comparisons of marginal costs. The court, however, should at-
tempt to view the economy from a taxpayer's perspective and
not involve itself with higher order mathematical economics.109
109. The Court in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & To-
bacco, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 2255 n.30 (1990), suggests that the Florida Supreme
Court hear economic testimony before it draw conclusions about tax incidence.
As I have pointed out above, we are not talking here of tax incidence but only
of relative marginal tax costs, a much simpler matter.
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